

COMPLAINT TO THE STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF COMPLAINT — ATTACHMENT TO JD-GC-6

Complainant: Abraham Rosenwald, Pro Se 1127 High Ridge Road, Suite 151 Stamford, CT 06905 (203) 391-1041 aberosenwald@icloud.com

Respondent: Aidan R. Welsh, Esq. Partner, Schoonmaker, George, Blomberg, Bryniczka & Welsh, P.C. (“SGB”) 1700 East Putnam Avenue, Suite 206 Old Greenwich, CT 06870

Underlying matter: *Rosenwald v. Rosenwald*, FST-FA26-6078292-S (dissolution); FST-FA26-5033652-S (restraining order, post-judgment). Cross-cases identified: FST-FA17-6031564-S and FST-FA22-5026729 (the two Diana-managed dockets on which Welsh has served as court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem).

Date: May 24, 2026

Doc ID: AR-GRV-20260524-WELSH_GAL_PATTERN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Complainant, Abraham Rosenwald, is the pro se Defendant in a Connecticut dissolution action and post-judgment restraining-order matter pending in the Stamford Judicial District before, among others, Hon. Leo V. Diana. The Respondent, Attorney Aidan R. Welsh, is a partner at Schoonmaker, George, Blomberg, Bryniczka & Welsh, P.C. (“SGB”), the firm representing the Plaintiff in the Defendant’s underlying matters. Attorney Welsh has not personally appeared as counsel in the Defendant’s case. The conduct grieved here is a structural bench-bar enmeshment that affects every Connecticut family-court case where Welsh has served, or may in future serve, as a court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) before Hon. Leo V. Diana.
2. **Lead evidence — public marketing-video admission attributed to Attorney Welsh.** On the documented record, the SGB firm has caused to be published, under its firm trade name, a public-facing marketing/teaser video (~4 minutes). At timestamp **00:02:24.340 – 00:02:40.440** of the video, a firm representative — on contextual best-effort identification, **Attorney Aidan R. Welsh** — states verbatim:

“Whether it is financial experts, forensic accountants, business evaluators, therapists, mediators, **the judges**. Those relationships that we form mean that we are well-respected, we are trusted, and therefore give our clients the best possible outcome in their case.”

The contextual basis for attributing the operative quote to Welsh is set out at § II of the underlying transcript (Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO), summarized here: (a) Welsh is the SGB partner who, as Connecticut Bar Association Family Law Section officer, personally introduced Hon. Leo V. Diana at the March 29, 2022 EWL220329 CLE program — making her the on-record voice for the firm’s bench-relationship branding in adjacent forums; (b) the firm has positioned Welsh as a firm-culture voice in public material generally; and (c) voice signature is consistent with other Welsh on-record speaking engagements. Final voice-identification confirmation may be developed at hearing. Even if a different SGB partner delivered the line, the firm-level approval of the marketing communication renders Welsh — as a firm partner — independently exposed under Rule 1.10 and Rule 7.1.

Welsh markets in firm-promulgated public material precisely the bench-relationship that her concurrent role as court-appointed GAL on Diana-managed dockets makes per-se prejudicial. That single sentence captures the structural posture grieved here.

3. This complaint identifies eight (8) discrete violations of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules 1.7, 1.10, 3.5, 7.1, 8.4(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d)) arising from Attorney Welsh’s dual role: (a) as the Connecticut Bar Association Family Law Section officer who personally introduced Hon. Leo V. Diana at the flagship Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) program EWL220329 (“Jennifer’s Law,” March 29, 2022); (b) as the court-appointed GAL on at least two of Diana, J.’s own family-court dockets; and (c) as the firm-attributed voice in the SGB marketing video described in ¶ 2 above. The pattern is structural, not isolated, and the Complainant respectfully submits that it constitutes the kind of bench-bar enmeshment Rule 3.5 (Impartiality of Tribunal), Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning Lawyer Services), and Rule 8.4(c)(d) (dishonesty; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) are meant to govern.
4. The Complainant does not allege, and does not need to allege, personal misconduct in any specific GAL appointment; the structural pattern itself is the violation. Attorney Welsh’s conduct is documented from public records: the Connecticut Bar Association’s published

CLE materials; the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s public docket-action log; SGB’s own attorney bio describing Attorney Welsh’s officer role with the Family Law Section; and the firm’s own publicly-distributed marketing video.

II. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The Statewide Grievance Committee has jurisdiction over this complaint under Connecticut Practice Book § 2-32(a) and the Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 1(F). The Respondent is admitted to the Connecticut Bar.
 2. The Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct govern the conduct of all attorneys admitted to practice in Connecticut. The Connecticut Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.11 (Disqualification), governs the bench side of the enmeshment grieved here; the Complainant raises Canon 2.11 only as context to the Respondent’s Rule 3.5 / Rule 7.1 / Rule 8.4 exposure on the bar side.
 3. The Complainant has not served a separate pre-grievance letter on Attorney Welsh, but has served the larger SGB firm with three pre-grievance letters in April 2026 (per the principal complaint AR-GRV-20260427-SGB at ¶ 6), to which no SGB attorney made substantive response. The Complainant has additionally served Open Letter v2 (Doc ID: AR-OPENLTR-20260523-sgbe-msl, May 23, 2026) on the SGB firm including Attorney Welsh; Section II.E.1 of that letter specifically identifies the Welsh-as-GAL pattern grieved here. No substantive response has been received. The marketing-video transcript at Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO was produced from a publicly-distributed source on May 24, 2026, and was not available in transcribed form prior to that date; the underlying video has been publicly distributed by the firm since at least May 13, 2026.
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III. PARTIES

A. Complainant

1. **Abraham Rosenwald** is the pro se Defendant in *Rosenwald v. Rosenwald*, FST-FA26-6078292-S and FST-FA26-5033652-S. The Complainant is self-represented, unemployed, and homeless; he resides at a rented mailbox address (1127 High Ridge Road, Suite 151, Stamford, CT 06905). He is a member of the class of pro se family-court litigants for whom Practice Book § 23-3 duty of solicitude was promulgated.

B. Respondent

1. **Aidan R. Welsh, Esq.** — Partner at SGB; per published SGB firm bio and Connecticut Bar Association records, current Assistant Treasurer-Secretary of the Connecticut Bar Association (“CBA”); officer of the CBA Family Law Section at the time of the EWL220329 CLE on March 29, 2022. Address: 1700 East Putnam Avenue, Suite 206, Old Greenwich, CT 06870. Email per firm directory: awelsh@sgbfamilylaw.com. Juris number: to be supplied at filing (publicly listed in CT Judicial Branch attorney directory).

C. Underlying Bench Actor (not a respondent)

1. **Hon. Leo V. Diana** — Connecticut Superior Court judge; Presiding Judge for Family Matters, Stamford Judicial District; lead author of the Statewide Family Time Management Order (effective 1/1/2025) and Connecticut Practice Book §§ 25-34A and 25-50A (same effective date). Judge Diana is not a respondent. His conduct is referenced only to the extent necessary to establish the structural bench-bar enmeshment that is the subject of the complaint against Attorney Welsh.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On March 29, 2022, the Connecticut Bar Association presented CLE program **EWL220329** (“Jennifer’s Law”), the public faculty agenda for which is preserved on the CBA’s archive at <https://www.ctbar.org/docs/default-source/education/materials/2021-2022-materials/ewl220329-jennifer’s-law-final-materials.pdf>. The agenda identifies **Attorney Aidan R. Welsh** as a faculty member; specifically, Attorney Welsh personally delivered the introduction for **Hon. Leo V. Diana**, who presented the segment “What is a judge looking for during a TRO hearing and/or trial, practical tips for practitioners.”
2. At the time of the EWL220329 program, Attorney Welsh was an officer of the Connecticut Bar Association Family Law Section. SGB’s own institutional bio (sgbfamilylaw.com) confirms Welsh’s CBA-officer role; SGB’s broader Section involvement is multi-generational, with founding partner Samuel V. Schoonmaker III having served as the first Chair of the Family Law Section, and current SGB-line lawyers (Schoonmaker IV, Cynthia George, Welsh, Miller) continuously occupying officer roles through the present.
3. Per public Connecticut Judicial Branch records and the Defendant’s docket-action research (compiled in `/Users/icloudabe/law_firm_associations/judicial_money_flow_20260520/08_DIANA_DEEP_DIVE.md` and cross-referenced in /

Users/icloudabe/law_firm_associations/

CLASS_ACTION_CANDIDATES_Diana_SGB_20260524.md), Attorney Welsh has served as court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem on at least two Hon. Leo V. Diana-managed dockets:

1. **FST-FA17-6031564-S** — GAL appointment of record;
2. **FST-FA22-5026729** — GAL appointment of record.

The list is not represented as exhaustive. The Defendant’s research is limited to the Diana docket-action log covering September 2023 through present; appointments before that window or on dockets not yet pulled may also exist. The two appointments documented above are sufficient to establish the pattern.

1. Under Connecticut Practice Book § 25-62 et seq., a GAL in a Connecticut family-court contested-custody matter is a court-appointed officer responsible for representing the best interests of the minor child. The GAL is paid from a combination of party funds and Judicial Branch funds, and the GAL’s recommendations carry substantial weight with the appointing judge. The appointing judge’s relationship with the appointed GAL is, by definition, a structural one: the judge selects, evaluates, and may remove the GAL.
2. The Complainant’s matter (FST-FA26-6078292-S) is currently designated SCHEDULING ORDER TRACK B (contested matter) by Diana, J.’s March 19, 2026 Scheduling Order (Entry 136.00). On the documented record, no GAL has yet been appointed in the Defendant’s matter. The structural concern grieved here is not that Attorney Welsh has been appointed in the Defendant’s case — he has not — but that the pattern of Welsh-as-Diana-appointed-GAL on Diana’s other dockets is operative across every case where Welsh may serve as GAL before Diana in the future, and is a fact that should have been disclosed by SGB in its appearance in the Defendant’s matter.
3. **The SGB firm marketing video — operative quote attributed to Welsh.** The SGB firm has caused to be publicly distributed (under its firm trade name “Schoonmaker George Premier Family Law Firm in Connecticut”) a marketing/teaser video of approximately four minutes in duration. The full Whisper-transcribed verbatim transcript is preserved at Doc ID **AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO**. At timestamp **00:02:24.340 – 00:02:40.440**, a firm representative — attributed contextually to Attorney Welsh as set out at ¶ 2 above — states:

“Whether it is financial experts, forensic accountants, business evaluators, therapists, mediators, **the judges**. Those relationships that we form mean that we are well-respected, we are trusted, and therefore give our clients the best possible outcome in their case.”

The Complainant respectfully submits that this is direct, first-person, on-record admission by the Respondent (or, in the alternative, by a partner-level firm voice imputable to the Respondent under Rule 1.10) that the firm markets — in its own public material, to attract prospective clients — the very bench-relationship that the GAL appointment stream and the EWL220329 CLE introduction documented in this complaint substantiate. The marketing admission is not a hedged or aspirational statement; it is a direct claim that the firm’s relationships with “the judges” produce “the best possible outcome.” Under Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1, this is per-se a false-or-misleading communication (it creates an unjustified expectation about results, and implies that results are achieved by means inconsistent with Rule 3.5 and Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.4). Under Rule 8.4(c) and 8.4(d), it is independently a dishonest misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

V. THE EIGHT COUNTS OF MISCONDUCT

COUNT 1 — Rule 1.7 (Concurrent Conflict of Interest)

1. Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) provides:

“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Rule, a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”

1. Attorney Welsh’s dual role as (i) the CBA Family Law Section officer who personally introduced Hon. Leo V. Diana at the flagship EWL220329 CLE, and (ii) the court-appointed GAL on Diana, J.’s docket in at least two cases, is a “personal interest of the lawyer” that creates a significant risk of material limitation on Welsh’s GAL representations and on his SGB-firm representations in any case before Diana, J. The Section-officer / Section-Chair role and the appointed-GAL role are institutionally

entwined: maintaining the GAL appointment stream from Diana, J. depends on the continued favor of Diana, J.; that favor is in turn cultivated through the CLE-introduction / bar-officer apparatus the Section operates. The dual role makes it foreseeable that Welsh’s professional judgment in any specific GAL representation will be materially limited by his interest in preserving the bench-bar relationship that supplies the appointments. The marketing-video admission at ¶ 16 above ratifies — in the firm’s own voice — exactly this enmeshment.

2. The Defendant does not allege any specific harm to the minor children represented by Welsh in FST-FA17-6031564-S or FST-FA22-5026729. The Defendant alleges that the structural conflict is itself the violation: Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not require proof of specific harm; it requires only a “significant risk” of material limitation, which is established by the facts above.

Rule 1.7(a)(2). Documented in *CLASS_ACTION_CANDIDATES_Diana_SGB_20260524.md*; *Open Letter v2 § II.E.1.*

COUNT 2 — Rule 1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts of Interest)

1. **Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a)** provides:

“While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.”

1. The Welsh personal interest established in Count 1 above imputes, under Rule 1.10(a), to every lawyer at SGB. The imputation is operative in every case where any SGB lawyer appears before Hon. Leo V. Diana — including *Rosenwald v. Rosenwald* (FST-FA26-6078292-S), where Diana, J., signed the March 19, 2026 Scheduling Order and remains a managing judge of the docket.
2. Rule 1.10(a)’s “personal interest” exception does not apply: Welsh’s interest in preserving the bench-bar relationship with Diana, J., does present a significant risk of materially limiting representation by other SGB lawyers, because the firm’s institutional posture in front of Diana, J. — and Diana, J.’s impartiality toward SGB-represented parties — is the

very thing at stake in any Canon 2.11 disclosure question. The imputation is not academic; it is operative in the matters now pending against the Defendant. The marketing-video admission ratifies the imputation in the firm’s own voice.

Rule 1.10(a). Documented in *CLASS_ACTION_CANDIDATES_Diana_SGB_20260524.md*; *Open Letter v2 § II.E.1.*

COUNT 3 — Rule 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal)

1. **Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(a)** provides:

“A lawyer shall not ... seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law.”

1. Rule 3.5 in Connecticut is rooted in the Code’s broader concern for the impartiality of the tribunal. The Code’s commentary clarifies that the rule reaches structural patterns that compromise the appearance of impartiality, not merely improper ex parte communications. Attorney Welsh’s role as the bar-officer who introduces the bench officer at flagship CLE, as the appointed GAL on the same bench officer’s docket, and as the (contextually-attributed) firm voice publicly marketing the firm’s relationships with “the judges” as producing “the best possible outcome,” is a structural pattern that compromises the appearance of impartiality in every case where Welsh’s firm appears before that bench officer.
2. The Connecticut Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.11(B)(2) requires a judge to disclose, on the record, information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even when the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. The Welsh-as-Diana-introducer / Welsh-as-Diana-appointed-GAL pattern — now reinforced by the marketing-video admission — is exactly the kind of information Canon 2.11(B)(2) requires the judge to disclose. The bar-side analogue under Rule 3.5 is the lawyer’s affirmative obligation not to participate in proceedings where his structural posture makes Canon 2.11(B)(2) disclosure necessary without himself surfacing the pattern. The Respondent has not surfaced the pattern. The duty under Rule 3.5 attaches.

Rule 3.5. Documented in *CLASS_ACTION_CANDIDATES_Diana_SGB_20260524.md*; *Open Letter v2 § II.E.1.*

COUNT 4 — Rule 8.4(a) / 8.4(c) / 8.4(d) (Misconduct)

1. Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 provides:

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (1) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; ... (3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”

1. The Respondent’s conduct violates each of subsections 8.4(1), 8.4(3), and 8.4(4):

- 1. Rule 8.4(1) (Misconduct in violating or assisting violations).** By participating in the dual role described above and by his firm’s continued appearance before Hon. Diana, J., without surfacing the pattern, Attorney Welsh has violated and is assisting his SGB partners to violate Rules 1.7, 1.10, and 3.5 as described in Counts 1, 2, and 3.
- 2. Rule 8.4(3) (Dishonesty by omission).** The CLE-introducer / Diana-GAL pattern is on the public record. The pattern’s relevance to Canon 2.11(B)(2) disclosure is plain. The Respondent’s silence on the pattern, when the firm in which he is a partner is repeatedly appearing before the bench officer at whose CLE he served as introducer and from whom he has received GAL appointments, is a misrepresentation by omission. The marketing-video admission, while not silent, contradicts the silence-on-the-record posture and reinforces the dishonesty theory.
- 3. Rule 8.4(4) (Prejudicial to the administration of justice).** The structural pattern itself prejudices the administration of justice in every case where SGB appears before Diana, J. — including the Defendant’s. The cumulative effect of the bench-bar enmeshment is to advantage the SGB-represented party in front of Diana, J., relative to a pro se or differently-represented opposing party. The Defendant is exactly that opposing party. The prejudice is operative on the record.

Rule 8.4(1); Rule 8.4(3); Rule 8.4(4). Documented in
CLASS_ACTION_CANDIDATES_Diana_SGB_20260524.md; Open Letter v2 § II.E.1.

COUNT 5 — Rule 3.5 (Impartiality of Tribunal) — bench-relationship marketing as structural Rule 3.5 violation

1. The operative quote at ¶ 16 above expressly conditions “the best possible outcome” on the firm’s “relationships” with “the judges.” On its face, this is a public claim by a member of the bar — attributed contextually to the Respondent — that the firm influences judicial outcomes through relationships rather than merit. Rule 3.5 reaches conduct that compromises the impartiality of the tribunal; the public, on-record marketing of a relationship-based influence theory is structurally identical to the conduct Rule 3.5 forbids, even where the influence is described as “respect” and “trust” rather than as ex parte communication. The marketing communication is itself a Rule 3.5 violation independent of any specific ex parte conduct.

Rule 3.5. *Documented in Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO at § II.*

COUNT 6 — Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning Lawyer Services)

1. **Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1** prohibits a “false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services,” including a communication “likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or [that] states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”
2. The operative quote is a per-se Rule 7.1 violation in both prongs:
 1. **Unjustified expectation of results.** The promise that “relationships” with “the judges” produce “the best possible outcome” is an unjustified expectation about results. Prospective clients are induced to retain the firm not on the basis of legal skill but on the basis of relational access to the bench.
 2. **Results by means that violate the Rules.** The implied means — relational influence on judicial decision-making — is itself a means that violates Rule 3.5 (Impartiality of Tribunal) and Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 2.4 (external influences) and 3.10 (extrajudicial activities that affect impartiality). The communication therefore states (or, at minimum, implies) that the firm achieves results by impermissible means.

Rule 7.1. *Documented in Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO at § II.*

COUNT 7 — Rule 8.4(c) (Dishonesty / Misrepresentation) — marketing-video admission

1. **Rule 8.4(c)** prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The marketing-video admission is either (a) a truthful admission — in which case the underlying conduct (relational influence on judicial outcomes) is itself prohibited and the firm has admitted to the prohibited conduct; or (b) a false marketing statement — in which case the misrepresentation about the firm’s results-influencing capacity is itself a Rule 8.4(c) violation. The Complainant does not, at this stage, take a position on which of (a) and (b) is operative. Either resolution sustains the Rule 8.4(c) count.

Rule 8.4(c). *Documented in Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO at § II.*

COUNT 8 — Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) — public-confidence harm

1. **Rule 8.4(d)** prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The public marketing — by a firm of partners and associates whose practice is exclusively before the Connecticut family-court bench — of the proposition that the firm’s bench-relationships produce “the best possible outcome” is independently prejudicial to the administration of justice for the following reasons:
 1. **Public-confidence erosion.** The marketing communication is publicly accessible to any prospective family-court litigant. It tells the public that judicial outcomes in the Stamford-Norwalk Judicial District (and, by extension, statewide where SGB practices) are influenced by relational factors. Pro se litigants and opposing parties evaluating their procedural posture cannot fail to internalize the implication. Public confidence in the impartiality of the bench is the structural foundation of the administration of justice. The marketing communication damages it.
 2. **Structural cloud over every Diana-bench ruling involving SGB.** Each judicial action taken by Hon. Leo V. Diana in any matter where SGB appears is now framed by the firm’s own public marketing as the product of the relationship rather than the merits. The Defendant’s matter is exactly such a case. The cloud is operative.
 3. **Section-officer institutional damage.** The Respondent is a Connecticut Bar Association officer. The Section is the principal voluntary professional organization the Judicial Branch consults on family-court rule-making. The Section’s institutional

credibility depends on the personal credibility of its officers in matters of professional conduct. The marketing communication damages the Section's credibility in addition to the Respondent's own.

Rule 8.4(d). *Documented in Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO at § II.*

VI. RELIEF REQUESTED

1. The Complainant respectfully requests that the Statewide Grievance Committee:
 1. **Find probable cause** as to each of the eight (8) violations documented above and refer the matter for full investigation and hearing under Practice Book § 2-32 et seq.
 2. **Impose discipline** appropriate to the gravity and breadth of the pattern, including consideration of a reprimand and an order that Attorney Welsh decline future GAL appointments from Hon. Leo V. Diana so long as Attorney Welsh remains a Section officer of the Connecticut Bar Association Family Law Section.
 3. **Order disclosure** in every pending case where SGB is counsel of record before Hon. Leo V. Diana that (i) Attorney Welsh has served as Diana, J.'s appointed GAL on at least two prior dockets; (ii) Attorney Welsh introduced Hon. Diana at the EWL220329 CLE; and (iii) the firm has publicly marketed its bench-relationships as producing "best possible outcome." Such disclosure to be filed by SGB within 14 days of the SGC's order in each pending case.
 4. **Order takedown or material modification** of the marketing-video communication identified at ¶ 16 above; and require the firm to lodge with the SGC a Rule 7.1 compliance certification identifying which firm partners reviewed and approved the marketing content.
 5. **Refer the underlying Canon 2.11 disclosure question** to the Connecticut Judicial Review Council for evaluation under Canons 2.11(A) and 2.11(B)(2). The SGC's authority over the bar side does not reach the bench side; the parallel referral preserves the institutional symmetry.
 6. **Issue such other relief** as the Statewide Grievance Committee deems appropriate to protect the public, the courts, and the integrity of the Connecticut Bar.
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VII. ATTACHMENTS / EXHIBITS

The following exhibits accompany this complaint:

- **Exhibit A:** EWL220329 CLE faculty agenda — “Jennifer’s Law,” Connecticut Bar Association, March 29, 2022 (publicly available at <https://www.ctbar.org/docs/default-source/education/materials/2021-2022-materials/ewl220329-jennifer’s-law-final-materials.pdf>), establishing Attorney Welsh’s introduction of Hon. Leo V. Diana on the panel.
- **Exhibit B:** SGB official attorney bio for Attorney Aidan R. Welsh (sgbfamilylaw.com), establishing Welsh’s CBA Family Law Section officer / CBA Assistant Treasurer-Secretary role.
- **Exhibit C:** Excerpted Hon. Leo V. Diana docket-action log entries for FST-FA17-6031564-S and FST-FA22-5026729 (CT Judicial Branch JIS public dockets), establishing Welsh’s GAL appointment of record on those dockets.
- **Exhibit D:** Open Letter v2 § II.E.1 (Doc ID: AR-OPENLTR-20260523-sgbe-msl, May 23, 2026), surfacing the Welsh-as-Diana-GAL pattern on the public record and identifying it as a structural concern.
- **Exhibit E:** March 19, 2026 Scheduling Order (Entry 136.00, FST-FA26-6078292-S) signed by Hon. Leo V. Diana, establishing Diana, J.’s active engagement on the Defendant’s docket — and therefore the operative nature of the Rule 1.10 imputation grieved in Count 2.
- **Exhibit F:** SGB Marketing Video Transcript (Doc ID AR-EVIDENCE-20260524-SGB-MARKETING-VIDEO) — verbatim Whisper transcript of the publicly-distributed SGB teaser video; operative quote at timestamp 00:02:24.340 – 00:02:40.440 (transcribed § II).

Note on personal identifying information: Per Rule 1(F) of the Statewide Grievance Committee Rules of Procedure and Section 4-7(a) of the Connecticut Practice Book, all exhibits have been reviewed and redacted to remove personal identifying information of minor children, parties, and non-respondent third persons.

VIII. VERIFICATION

Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 2-32(a) and the JD-GC-6 attestation block, I, Abraham Rosenwald, hereby state under penalties of false statement that the foregoing Statement of Complaint is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that the conduct described herein occurred substantially as described.

Abraham Rosenwald, Pro Se Complainant 1127 High Ridge Road, Suite 151 Stamford, CT 06905 (203) 391-1041 aberosenwald@icloud.com

Date: _____

Doc ID: AR-GRV-20260524-WELSH_GAL_PATTERN